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FLOOD INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: RISING
SEA LEVELS CHALLENGE THE NFIP
Ernest B. Abbott*
I.

INTRODUCTION

I really don't know why it is that all of us are so committed
to the sea, except I think it's because in addition to the fact
that the sea changes, and the light changes, and ships
change, it's because we all came from the sea. And it is an
interesting biological fact that all of us have, in our veins
the exact same percentage of salt in our blood that exists in
the ocean, and, therefore, we have salt in our blood, in our
sweat, in our tears. We are tied to the ocean. And when we
go back to the sea - whether it is to sail or to watch it - we

are going back from whence we came. - John F. Kennedy1
Each year more than 1.2 million 2 people23move to coastal areas in
the United States. As of 2010, approximately 123.3 million people,
* Of Counsel, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. The author
acknowledges the very substantial assistance of Wendy Huff Ellard, Associate, and
Lara Ilao O'Dougherty, Legal Case Assistant, in assisting in our presentation at the
Fordham Symposium, in supplementing our research, and editing the article.
1. John F. Kennedy, Remarks in Newport at the Australian Ambassador's
Dinnerfor the America's Cup Crews, in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1961: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC
MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, JANUARY 1 TO

NOVEMBER 22, 1963 684 (1964).
2. Susan C. Moser et al., Ch. 25: CoastalZone Development and Ecosystems,
in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL

CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 579, 581 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., U.S. Global Change
Research
Program
2014),
available
at
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/coasts.
3. See NOAA, SPATIAL TRENDS IN COASTAL SOCIOECONOMICS (STICS):
COASTAL
COUNTY
DEFINITIONS
(2013),
available
at
http://coast.noaa.gov/htdata/SocioEconomic/NOAACoastalCountyDefinitions.pdf
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or roughly half of the U.S. population, lived in coastal shoreline5
counties. 4 This is in addition to the more than 180 million tourists
who visit U.S. coastal destinations each year. With population
growth comes the infrastructure and development 6 necessary to
accommodate a life by the water and the potential risk of flood
damage to that infrastructure and development.
This risk of damage from high water is increasing and not just due
to the rise of property values in coastal areas. We have begun to see
measurable increases in the sea level in coastal communities. 7 Since
the 1980s, the frequency and magnitude of "super storms" 8 has
increased, bringing greater damage to developed shorelines,
inundation of low areas, coastal erosion, wetland loss and saltwater
intrusion into estuaries and freshwater aquifers. Projections of sealevel increases vary. Sea levels are expected to rise by a minimum of
8 inches and up to 6.6 feet by 2100. 9 Even if one were to rely upon
minimal estimates, estimated damages would be no small matter.
According to a recent report by the U.S. Global Change Research
Program:
?redirect-30locm. Coastal areas refers to counties that are directly adjacent to the
open ocean, major estuaries, and the Great Lakes.
4. See NOAA, NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION REPORT: POPULATION
TRENDS
FROM
1970
TO
2020
(2013),
available
at
http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/features/coastal-population-report.pdf.
5. Moser, supra note 2.
6. Such as roads, residential properties, business development, sanitary
wastewater and electrical utilities, among other things.
7. See

Sea

Level

101,

Sea

Level

Rise,

CLIMATECENTRAL.ORG,

http://www.climatecentral.org/what-we-do/our-programs/sea-level-rise/
(last
visited Oct. 27, 2014). Global sea levels have risen about eight inches since 1880.
8. From 2000 to 2013 the average number of "billion dollar" weather events in
the U.S. was ten events per year, an increase from six billion-dollar events per year
the decade earlier. See Billion-Dollar Disaster Event Types By Year (CPIAdjusted), Billion-Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters: Time Series, NOAA,

http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/time-series (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
9. Adam Parris et al., NOAA TECHNICAL REPORT, OAR CPO-1, GLOBAL SEA
LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE U.S. NAT'L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 3 (2012). See
also AECOM, THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON
THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 (2013) [hereinafter
FEMA CLIMATE REPORT]. This report was commissioned by FEMA, at the request
of GAO, to study the effects of climate change and population growth on the
National Flood Insurance Program. This report puts forward a more conservative
maximum SLR of 4 feet. Id. at ES-4. In the context of risk-based analysis, some
decision-makers use a wider range of scenarios resulting in a 6.6 ft SLR. Id. at C-8.
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The projected costs associated with one foot of sea level rise by
2100 are roughly $200 billion. These figures only cover costs of
beach nourishment, hard protective measures, and losses of inundated
land and property where protection is not warranted, but exclude
losses of valuable ecosystem services, as well as indirect losses from
business disruption, lost economic activity, impacts on economic
growth, or other non-market losses.1 0
Economic considerations aside, low-lying shorelines, such as the
Atlantic and Gulf Coast shorelines, are particularly susceptible even
to minor sea-level rise: "[T]he slope of these areas is so gentle that a
small rise in sea level produces a large inland shift of shoreline."1' 1
A large inland shift of shoreline due to sea-level rise has the
potential not only to change existing boundaries of the areas mapped
as coastal flood hazard zones but also to expand the size of the areas
with significant flood risk. Approximately 58,000 square kilometers
of coastline along the Atlantic seaboard and Gulf of Mexico are less
than 1.5 meters above sea level, with approximately 1,600 square
kilometers less than 1 meter above sea level. 12 "Sea level rise is not
just a problem of the future, but is already affecting some coastal
communities during high tide, such' 13as Charleston, South Carolina,
and Olympia in South Puget Sound."
With the growth in population living along the water, and projected
increases in water elevation levels over the next several decades, we
must consider how well the National Flood Insurance Program
("NFIP") 14 will succeed both in assuring that development near the
water will be reasonably safe from flooding by encouraging more
mitigation as well as adaptation measures, and in achieving some
measure of fiscal stability so that taxpayer bailouts will no longer be
needed to prop up the program.

10. Moser, supra note 2, at 595.
11. NAT'L ASSESSMENT SYNTHESIS TEAM, U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL

108 (2001). This large inland
shift may also be referred to as a shift of the SFHA.
12. Blake Hudson, Coastal Land Loss and Mitigation - Adaptation Dilemma:
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 73 LA. L. REv. 31, 46 (2012).
13. Moser, supra note 2, at 581.
14. National Flood Ins. Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. (2012)
[hereinafter NFIP].
CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE VARIABILITY
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In Part I of this paper, we document our view that losses from
meteorological events, primarily flooding, have been increasing
dramatically. Thus, however effective the NFIP has been in reducing
flood risk below what it might have been in its absence, the NFIP has
not been effective enough. In Part II, we set forth the basic
techniques available to policy makers to reduce the vulnerability of
existing and future infrastructure from loss due to flooding and other
natural hazards. In Part III.A., we describe the many efforts
Congress and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
("FEMA"), which administers the NFIP, have made in the flood
insurance program to reduce the vulnerability of our built
infrastructure and ecosystems to flood losses. While these efforts
have been extensive, they have also been limited by economic and
political realities: flood risk along the coasts and waterways can be
very expensive, particularly for structures that were not located or
designed to be out of harm's way during flooding at the levels now
being experienced, or at the flood levels now being predicted. In Part
III.B., we discuss the many ways that Congress and FEMA have
sought to use disaster assistance programs to encourage property
owners to mitigate the risk of future disaster events, particularly
flood disaster events, through physical mitigation and financial
mitigation (insurance).
Despite these efforts, by 2012, the NFIP was burdened with a $23
billion debt and a growing recognition that past efforts to curtail
flood losses had not been enough. 15 Part IV of this paper first
discusses the brave, if perhaps naYve, attempt of Congress to fix the
problem by quickly removing historic and systemic premium
subsidies through the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of
2012 ("BW-12"). 16 But less than two years later, after the impact of
BW-12 was felt in flood-prone areas across the country, Congress
quickly retreated by enacting the Homeowner Flood Insurance

15. Association of State Floodplain Managers, FloodIns. Affordability, ASFPM
Recommendations to Address the Impact of NFIP Reform 2012 (BW-12),

FLOODS.ORG
(Apr.
26,
2013),
http://www.floods.org/acefiles/documentlibrary/2012 NFIP Reform/ASFPM recommendations on BW12_affordability_26April2013 .pdf.
16. Biggert-Waters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916-88 (2012) [hereinafter BW-12].
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Affordability Act of 2014 ("HFIAA"). 17 Part V will conclude with
observations on the challenges that the NFIP faces given the growth
of flood risk recently forecast in FEMA's climate change study. 8
The controversy generated by BW-12's effort to force property
owners to bear the real cost of the flood risk they face is bound to
return - again and again and again.

II. PROPERTY LOSSES FROM METEOROLOGICAL EVENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES ARE INCREASING DRAMATICALLY

Over the last 60 years, property losses in the United States from
meteorological events have increased significantly.19 This is not a
political statement, thrown out to inflame the debate on whether our
climate is changing; 2° it is a simple fact.2 1 The annual number of
presidentially- declared "major disasters" has grown four-fold from
the 10-20 experienced 60 years ago to an average of over 60

17. Homeowner Flood Ins. Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128
Stat. 1020 (2014) [hereinafter HFIAA].
18. FEMA CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 9.
19. See
FEMA,
Disaster
Declarations
by
Year,
http://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); see generally
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS

IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL

ASSESSMENT (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., U.S. Global Change
Research Program 2014), availableat http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/.
20. Consider statements made by Dr. Pielke to the Committee on Environment
and Public Works of the United States Senate that, "weather-related losses have not
increased since 1990 as a portion of GDP," and that "[fWloods have not increased in
the U.S. in frequency or intensity since at least 1950" (emphasis added), and
"[fllood losses as a percentage of US GDP have dropped by about 75 percent."
Hearing on Climate Change: It's Happening Now Before the Sen. Com. on Env 't
and Pub. Works, 113th Cong. 3, 6-7 (2013) (statement of Dr. Pielke). Dr. Pielke
goes on to state that "[t]he inability to detect and attribute changes in hurricanes,
floods, tornadoes and drought does not mean that human-caused climate change is
not real or of concern." Id. at 2.
21. See John Walsh et al., Ch. 2: Our Changing Climate, in CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 19,
41 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., U.S. Global Change Research Program 2014),
available
at
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/our-changingclimate/introduction. The intensity, frequency, and duration of North Atlantic
hurricanes, as well as the frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes,
have all increased since the early 1980s. Id.
CLIMATE
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declarations per year over the last decade, as shown in the following
table. 22
120

FEMA declared disasters 1953-2013

100
so
60
40

. .

0
2013 data is through February 24
Data source: FEMA
Image courtesy of Franklin Nutter's Senate Testimony

All but a handful of these disasters involved meteorological events
such as hurricanes, tornados, ice storms, and heavy rains. According
to the NFIP, 90 percent of all natural disasters in the United States
23
involved flooding.
While the number of disaster declarations has increased
dramatically, this only specifies the number of times that a state
governor has persuaded the president to declare a disaster, based on
the governor's certification that the "disaster is of such severity and
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the
State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance

22. See Hearing on Climate Change: It's Happening Now Before the U.S. S.
Comm. On Env't and Pub. Works, 113 Cong. 17 (2013) (testimony of Franklin W.
Nutter, President, Reinsurance
Association of America), available at
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction-Files.View&FileStore-i
d-f86b767e-7a71-48b4-8eef-7bd9adld3884.
23. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-297R, OVERVIEW OF
GAO's PAST WORK ON THE NAT'L FLOOD INS. PROGRAM 3 (2014). See also ASS'N
OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOOD MAPPING THE NATION: A COST
ANALYSIS FOR THE NATION'S FLOOD MAP INVENTORY 3 (2013) (citing NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAPPING THE ZONE: IMPROVING FLOOD MAP ACCURACY

(The National Academies Press 2009)).

16

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVI

is necessary. ' ' 2 4 Some argue that declarations may be influenced by
political considerations perhaps more than by the magnitude of the
event. 25 Additionally, declarations can arise from events with a small
geographic footprint, such as a small town demolished by a
26
tornado.
On the other hand, hurricanes generally cause much more
widespread damage and can trigger multiple declarations in all of the
states along the east coast of the United States, as was the case for
Hurricane Floyd. 27 Accordingly, the number of presidential disaster
declarations may not be a good indicator of the increase in disaster
losses.
The growth in property losses from meteorological events has also
been documented by reinsurance companies.
Munich Re, for

24. Robert T. Stafford Emergency Assistance and Disaster Relief Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 § 401(a) (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
5121 et seq. (2012)) [hereinafter Stafford Act]; See also 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2012).
25. See Rick Sylves & Zoltdin I. Bfizis, Presidential Disaster Declaration
Decisions, 1953-2003: What Influences Odds of Approval?, 39 ST. AND LOCAL
Gov'T REv. 3, 14 (2007).
26. On May 22, 2011, a three-quarter of a mile wide tornado struck Joplin, and
continued for approximately six miles. There were over 150 fatalities and more
than
7,000
structures
damaged
or
destroyed.
http://www.ustornadoes.com/2013/05/22/j oplin-missouri-ef5-tornado-may-222011/. The tornado was declared major disaster FEMA-1980-DR-MO.
27. FEMA-1295-DR (New Jersey); Major Disaster and Related Determinations,
64 Fed. Reg. 52,314-15 (Sept. 28, 1999); FEMA-1296-DR (New York); Major
Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,316 (Sep. 28, 1999); FEMA1294-DR (Pennsylvania); Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg.
52,317 (Sept. 28, 1999); FEMA-1293-DR (Commonwealth of Virginia); Major
Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,318-19 (Sept. 28, 1999);
FEMA-1297-DR (Delaware); Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed.
Reg. 54,015-16 (Oct. 5, 1999); FEMA-1299-DR (South Carolina); Major Disaster
and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,017 (Oct. 5, 1999); FEMA-1302-DR
(Connecticut); Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,893
(Oct. 8, 1999); FEMA-1300-DR (Florida); Major Disaster and Related
Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,893-94 (Oct. 8, 1999); FEMA-1303-DR;
(Maryland); Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,895 (Oct.
8, 1999); FEMA-1292-DR (North Carolina); Major Disaster and Related
Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,348 (Oct. 19, 1999); FEMA-1305-DR (New
Hampshire); Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,412-13
(Oct. 29, 1999); FEMA-1308-DR (Maine); Major Disaster and Related
Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,915-16 (Nov. 30, 1999).
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example, published a table of the total annual insured and uninsured
28
property losses caused by catastrophic events over the last 60 years:
Figure 1.Significant UScatastophe losses (1950-2010)
Lo s ( 1 biion eco r c o&
-- ar r
rtaitIlI)

Overall loses from U s gii

cata zpies

,; nsured osses totaled $6 3bn-

L

71
S*J rMeNa~a

in,2010 totaled $8.,

B'

CP-7 10hnich Re

For the first 40 of these years, from 1950 to 1990, there was no
year in which annual disaster losses reached $15 billion, and, indeed,
annual disaster losses before 1990 were well under $5 billion 75
percent of the time. 29 But in the 22 years since 1990, disaster losses
have more than doubled. 30 Annual disaster losses have exceeded $10
billion more than 75 percent of the time. 3 1 And the scale of the 'big
disaster year' has surged dramatically as well. Disaster losses
exceeded $40 billion in 1993, 1994, 1995, 2004, 2005, 2008,32 and
(though not shown on the chart) 2012 - due to Superstorm Sandy.3 3
Another major reinsurer, Swiss Re, tells the same story. Swiss Re
focused only on the period from 1970 on - and so includes the impact
of Hurricane Sandy: 34
28. See
Munich
Reinsurance,
NatCat
Services,
http://www.munichre.com/natcatservice.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Dolye Rice, Hurricane Sandy, Drought Cost U.S. $100 Billion, USA
Today,
JAN.
25,
2013,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2013/01/24/global-disaster-report-sandydrought/1862201/.
34. See ANDREW CASTALDI, SwIss RE, WHILE LOSSES ARE GETTING BIGGER,
THE
WORLD
IS
GETTING
SMALLER
6
(2014),
available
at
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Figure 1: Insured lasses vs uninsured Iosses, 1970-2013
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Note that both Munich Re and Swiss Re use inflation-adjusted
dollars, so this growth in disaster losses is not caused by inflation.
Nor can it be explained simply by population growth, as the increase
in disaster damages is much higher than the doubling of the
population of the United States
from 150,697,361 people in 1950 to
35
2010.
in
people
308,745,538
In recognition of the past and projected increase in disaster
damage, on November 1, 2013, President Obama issued Executive
Order 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate
Change. The Order required agencies, including FEMA, to review
"land and water related policies, programs, and regulations that may
affect watersheds, natural resources, ecosystems, and communities
that depend on them., 36 The Order directed agencies to "focus on
https://www.amis.com.mx/InformaWeb/Documentos/Archivos/AndrewCastaldi.pd

f.
35. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CPH-1-1, UNITED STATES: 2010: SUMMARY
POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS, 2010 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND

HOUSING 2 (2013); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1950,
NUMBER OF INHABITANTS

XIV (1952).

36. Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,819, 66,820 (Nov. 6, 2013).
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program and policy adjustments that promote the dual goals of
greater climate resilience and carbon sequestration, or other
reductions to the sources of climate change., 37 It also created the
Council on Climate Preparedness and Resilience in helping the
efforts of regions, states, local governments, and tribes to:
(i) identify and seek to remove or reform barriers that
discourage investments or other actions to increase the
Nation's resilience to climate change while ensuring
continued protection of public health and the environment;
(ii) reform policies and Federal funding programs that may,
perhaps, unintentionally, increase vulnerability of natural
or built systems, economic sectors, natural resources, or
communities to climate change related risks;
(iii) identify opportunities to support and encourage
smarter, more climate resilient investments by States, local
communities, and tribes, including by providing incentives
through agency guidance, grants, technical assistance,
performance measures, safety considerations, and other
programs.... 38
In recognition of the potential impact of climate change on the
financial strength and viability of the NFIP, FEMA put forth its
Climate Change Adaptation Policy Statement3 9 in which FEMA
resolved to undertake a study on the impacts of climate change on the
NFIP and incorporate climate considerations in the NFIP reform
effort and grant investment strategies.
FEMA commissioned a
study, The Impact of Climate Change and Population Growth on the
National Flood Insurance Program through 2100, which looked at

how

existing

climate

change

data40

and population growth

37. Id. at 66,820.
38. Id. at 66,819.
39. An agency-wide directive to integrate climate change adaption planning and
actions into Agency programs, policies, and operations. FEMA, 2011-OPPA-01,
FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT (2012), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1919-250453330/508 climatechangepolicystatement.pdf.
40. The report used assessments from the United States Climate Change
Science Program (USCCSP) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). FEMA CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at vii, ES-1-2.
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projections in coastal and riverine regions4 1 are likely to affect
Special Flood Hazard Areas ("SFHAs"), the number of NFIP
policyholders, premium rates, and average loss cost per policy,
through 2100. 4 2 The report generally found that as sea level rises,
SFHAs are projected to increase significantly across the nation, with
43
the number of policyholders projected to double by 2100.
Finally, in May 2014, the White House published the National
Climate Assessment that included, for the first time, an express
acknowledgement that climate change is happening at an alarming
rate and is having a real impact on multiple levels.4 4 As noted in this
report:
Decisions about how to address climate change can be
complex and responses will require a combination of
adaption and mitigation actions.
Decision-makers whether individuals, public officials or others - may need
help integrating scientific information into adaption and
mitigation decisions.4 5
The increasing cost of "natural" disasters, and the increasing
likelihood that these costs will increase further if nothing is done,
demands that we review how the NFIP,46 the nation's principal flood
mitigation program, will adapt and respond to the increasing flood
risk. This article illustrates how difficult it will be to base flood
insurance premiums paid by property owners on the current,
actuarial, risk of damage due to flood - let alone the greater flood
risks now being projected.
Basing floodplain management
requirements on projections of flood risk pose similar challenges.
41. A detailed region-by-region assessment was not intended, instead the study
focused on U.S. coastal and riverine areas of greatest population and largest
inventory of at-risk properties. Id. at ES-1.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 5-27.
44. See generally, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 21.
45. Richard Moss et al., Ch. 26: Decision Support, Connecting Science, Risk
Perception, and Decisions, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT

621(Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., U.S.

Global
Change
Research
Program
2014),
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report/regions/coasts.
46. NFIP, supra note 14.

available

at
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III. WHAT CAN You Do To BUILD DISASTER RESILIENCE?

We begin by summarizing the different techniques or actions
available to governments to increase disaster resilience. Natural
disasters, such as tornados, earthquakes, floods, windstorms,
hurricanes, tsunamis, ice storms, and wildfires may be called
"natural ' 47 or even characterized as "acts of God.",4 8 But natural
disasters are in part man-made. These events become catastrophes
only because people built homes, businesses, and infrastructure in
ways and in places where they would be harmed by naturally
occurring events.
Nearly all "natural disasters" feature some human contribution,
whether it be poor construction standards (as in Lisbon [1755
earthquake]) the channeling of a mighty river (as in the 1927
[Mississippi River] flood),
or shoddy levees and urban sprawl (as in
49
New Orleans [in 2005]).
Generally, it is not possible to reduce the frequency of ice storms
or heavy rains in a river basin, or to steer hurricanes away from
populated areas. 50
Rather, building disaster resilience in a
community requires either moving or removing vulnerable structures
and facilities from harm's way, or building stronger structures or
facilities so that they are not damaged when the natural disaster event
occurs. There are really only a few tools that can be used to build
disaster resilience, but the way these tools can be implemented can
47. For example, a major disaster under the Stafford Act is defined as any
"natural catastrophe ... or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion," that
meets the other criteria that allow the president to declare one. Stafford Act,
§102(2); 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2).
48. Gilbert Fowler White, Human Adjustment to Floods: A Geographical
Approach to the Flood Problem in the United States, in UNIV. OF CHI. DEP'T OF
GEOGRAPHY RESEARCH SERIES 2 (Wesley Calef ed., 1964).
49. DANIEL FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 3 (Aspen Press 2d ed.
2010).
50. See JAMES ROGER FLEMING, FIXING THE SKY: THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF

151-52 (2010). In October 1947, GE, along
with the U.S. Army, led "Project Cirrus" which consisted of "bomb[ing] the heart
of the [hurricane] with 80 pounds of dry ice and drop[ing] 100 pounds more into
two embedded convection towers" to see if this 'hurricane bursting' would reduce
its winds or redirect it. Id. at 151. Hurricane King made a "hairpin" turn west and
struck the coast of the Georgia and South Carolina border. A tree fell killing one
person and caused more than $32 million in damage. Georgians were "pretty sore
at the army and navy for fooling around with the hurricane." Id. at 152.
WEATHER AND CLIMATE CONTROL
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depending on specific natural threats being

Spread Public Information About Risk

First, it is very important to spread public information about the
risks of flooding and other hazards to communities, homes, and
businesses. If people do not know that a risk exists or how big it is,
they will not take steps to protect themselves and their property from
it, and they will not know how to protect themselves. Taking these
steps is particularly important for events that occur relatively
infrequently in a particular geographic area. 51 Thus, it is important to
know whether a building or pipeline is located in an area with a high
risk of flooding. One of the three prongs of the NFIP includes the
development of flood maps across virtually the entire country,
52
specifying the areas in which there is a "Special Flood Hazard.,
Armed with knowledge that there is a special flood hazard in an area,
property owners can decide whether to build elsewhere or to elevate
structures so that they will not suffer damage.
These "Flood
'
53
Insurance Rate Maps" also serve to determine which properties are
subject to additional insurance, building code, and land use planning
requirements discussed below.
B.

Adopt and Enforce Building Codes

Second, governments can require that buildings must meet
construction standards so that they are not blown off their
foundations or lose their roofs in high winds and have windows that
can withstand winds of a certain level. Building standards and codes
may also be adopted by professional standard-setting organizations
such as the American Society of Civil Engineers, the International
Electrotechnical Commission, or the Underwriters' Laboratories.
51. Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 154 F.2d
450, 453 (6th Cir. 1946). Judge Simons notes: "It may be that such a disaster could
occur only upon a concatenation of circumstances of not too great probability, and
that the odds are against it. It is common experience, however, that catastrophies
[sic] occur at unexpected times and in unforeseen places... A court of equity will
not gamble with human life, at whatever odds, and for loss of life there is no

remedy that in an equitable sense is adequate." Id.
52. NFIP, 42 U.S.C. § 4101.
53. Id. 44 CFR § 59.1 (Definition of "Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)).
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Building codes can require that buildings be elevated in flood hazard
areas. Requirements of this type are legion and can be exceptionally
specific. Building codes may require the use of hurricane clips in
hurricane-prone areas to help assure that the roof does not blow off
during high winds. 54 Again, in high wind areas, building codes may
require that mobile homes be affixed to their foundations with metal
clamps to reduce the likelihood that they will be blown off their
foundations in high winds.55 In the central part of the United States
where tornados are frequent, some local communities require that
mobile home sites have a shared tornado shelter 56 or for individual
homes, FEMA provides guidance for communities to build safe
rooms - located underground or in the interior of the house with
reinforced walls. 57 With respect to flood risk, floodplain management
ordinances include requirements to install flood vents in crawl spaces
and lower enclosures 58 or to construct breakaway walls below the
lowest floor of an elevated structure.59 In most communities in the
United States, the floodplain management ordinances have been
adopted to meet minimum "Requirements for Floodplain
Management Regulations" set forth in FEMA's regulations as a
condition to community participation in the NFIP.
Some
54. See Florida Building Code, Fla. Stat. 553.844, Sec. 201.3 (2014). For
example, in Florida, when a roof is replaced on a building located in a "wind-borne
debris region" the roof framing shall be strengthened by adding metal connectors,
clips, straps, and fasteners such that the performance level equals or exceeds uplift
capacities..." Id.
55. See Minn. R. 1350.1200-3100.
For example, "Anchoring equipment
exposed to weathering shall have a resistance to weather deterioration at least
equivalent to that provided by a coating of paint or zinc on steel of not less than
0.625 ounces per square foot on each side of surface" with different "allowable soil
bearing pressures depending on the soil component of the foundation." See also,
44 C.F.R. § 60.3(b)(8) (2014).
56. See David Lieb, Safe Room Mandates Remain Rare in Tornado States, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/safe-room-

mandates-remain-rare-tornado-states. "A Wichita, Kan., ordinance adopted in 1994
requires storm shelters in existing mobile home parks with at least 20 homes and in
new parks with at least 10 mobile homes. A 2000 ordinance adopted in Wichita's
home of Sedgwick County also required storm shelters for all new mobile home
parks with space for at least 10 homes." Id.
57. See

FEMA,

P-361,

COMMUNITY SAFE ROOMS

DESIGN

(2d ed. 2008).

58. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c)(5) (2014).
59. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(e)(5) (2014).
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communities have also strengthened their floodplain management
ordinances in order to qualify all property owners in the community
for premium discounts available under FEMA's "Community Rating
System.
A key feature of building codes generally, and of floodplain
management regulations specifically, is that they normally apply only
to new construction or very significant repairs/ renovations of
existing structures. 61 It can be exceptionally expensive to retrofit
existing structures to meet newly adopted building code
requirements, and building owners may not be able to afford the cost
of those retrofits.
So existing structures are "grandfathered,"
meaning compliance with new codes is not required until triggered
by a significant rebuilding or renovation project. In the NFIP and
FEMA's Minimum Requirements for Flood Plain Management
Regulations, either "substantial damage" or a "substantial
improvement," defined as damage or improvement which costs 50
percent or more of the market value of the property, will trigger a
requirement that the entire building be elevated and otherwise
modified in order to receive a building permit. 62 As a result, the
vulnerability of different structures to hazards, including flooding,
will vary widely in a community, with newer structures generally
60. Tulsa, Oklahoma cleared more than 900 buildings from its flood plains and
the average premium discount for policies in its SFHA is $583. See FEMA,
FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION COMMUNITY RATING
SYSTEM FACT SHEET 1 (2014), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/ 1395661546460d6859e8d080fba06b34a6fl a4d0abdba/NFIPCRSMarch+2014+508.pdf.
61. See generally e.g., INTERNATIONAL CODE CONSORTIUM, ICC IBC (2012):
INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (2011).

62. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2014), defining "substantial damage" and "substantial

improvement;" see also 44 C.F.R. § 60.8 (2014) (incorporating the definitions of
44 C.F.R § 59.1 into FEMA's Part 60 Regulations), and, e.g., 44 C.F.R. §

60.3(c)(2)-(3), (5), (7)-(8), (10) (2014) (imposing additional building elevation and
construction requirements on new or substantially improved structures). These
minimum requirements only look to the cost of improvements built in a single year.
Communities can obtain flood insurance discounts if they have defined "substantial
improvement" as the total cost of improvements over, say, a three-year period.
FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM COMMUNITY RATING SYSTEM
COORDINATOR'S MANUAL 430-518, OMB BULL No.1660-0022, available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data 1406897194816fc66ac50a3af94634751342cb35666cd/FIA- 15 NFIP-CoordinatorsManual_2014.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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built stronger and higher, and older structures63built to less protective
building codes less resilient to disaster events.
C. Adopt and Enforce Land Use PlanningOrdinances
Third, where there is information about the specific locations in an
area that are vulnerable to risks, communities can adopt and enforce
ordinances or regulations that limit construction of structures,
facilities, or infrastructure. For example, Florida has adopted state
building code requirements that vary depending on whether
structures are located in coastal areas subject to high winds from
hurricanes and tropical storms. 6 4 In areas in the urban/forest
interface, where there is a severe risk of wildfires, codes include
minimum distances between buildings and the forest, 65 and
construction of fire ponds to give firefighters a source of water with
which to combat a blaze.66
FEMA's Requirements for Floodplain Management Regulations
are major components of a community's land use planning program
because community ordinances must limit or restrict development in
SFHAs shown on the Flood Insurance Rate Map. If a property is
located in an area which is mapped as an SFHA, then construction on
that property must comply with specific requirements that varies
depending on the flood risk information provided on the map
including: the height of the "base flood elevation," whether the

63. E.g., Am. Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, ASCE 7: Minimum Design Loads for
Buildings and Other Structures (2nd ed. 2003); 49 C.F.R. § 193.2013 (2014).
64. Fla. Stat. § 1609.2 (2010).
65. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 14, § 1299.03 (2013), which requires "a distance of not
less than 30 feet on each side of the building or structure or to the property line,
whichever is nearer." Defensible space is required to be maintained at all times,
whenever flammable vegetative conditions exist. One hundred feet (100 ft.) of
defensible space clearance shall be maintained in two distinct "Zones" as follows:
"Zone 1" extends thirty feet (30 ft.) out from each "Building or Structure," or to the
property line, whichever comes first; "Zone 2" extends from thirty feet (30 ft.) to
one hundred feet (100 ft.) from each "Building or Structure," but not beyond the
property line.
66. Town of South Thomaston's Fire Protection Ordinance, requires a
developer of a subdivision to construct a 250,000 gallon fire pond within 2,000 feet
of any proposed development if no adequate water supply exists. Curtis v. Town of
S. Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657 (Me. 1998).
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property is subject to wave action in coastal areas, 6 7 and whether the
property is located in a "floodway" rather than a "floodplain., 6 8
D. Provide and Strengthen Property Owners' Incentives to Mitigate
Risk
1. Property Owners Responsible for Real Economic Cost of Risk
Economic theory holds that the best way to assure that property
owners will protect themselves from the risk of disaster events is if
the property owners pay the full cost incurred when the property is
69
damaged from disasters.
Where the costs incurred by property
owners are relatively infrequent, as in the case of disasters that may
be experienced (in a given location) only once in a generation or less,
it will be difficult for property owners to assess the actual risk of loss
to a property. However, if insurance is available, and if premiums
are actuarially based, then the purchase of insurance by the property
owner will internalize the expected cost of disaster events. Premiums
will be more expensive in more risky areas. Premiums for properties
that are built to withstand natural forces - built to withstand stronger
winds and elevated above expected flood heights - will be cheaper
than premiums on properties located in higher risk areas or built of
flimsy materials below the expected flood level.
In theory, the difference in insurance premiums will cause a
property owner to invest in mitigation measures, such as elevation,
structural enhancements, and installation of windows with a higher
wind rating, because it is more cost effective to invest in mitigation
than to continue to pay high insurance premiums. 70 The theory
breaks down, however, when the property owner does not pay the
full actuarial cost of insurance for the risk, and it also breaks down

67. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(e)(4) (2014).
68. Flood plain or flood-prone area means any land area susceptible to being
inundated by water from any source. A regulatory floodway is the channel of a

river or other watercourse and the adjacent land areas that must be reserved in order
to discharge the base flood without cumulatively increasing the water surface
elevation more than the designated height. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2014).
69. George Priest, Ch. 12: The Government, the Market, and the Problem of
CatastrophicLoss, in DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 332-34 (Daniel Farber et al. eds.,
Aspen Press 2010).

70. The cost of inaction is 4 to 10 times greater than the cost associated with
preventative hazard mitigation. See Moser, supra note 2, at 595.
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when the property owner is not responsible for the full costs incurred
as a result of a natural catastrophe. If property owners believe that
they will be bailed out by disaster assistance in the event of disaster
damage, they will have less of an incentive to protect themselves and
their property from potential hazards.
Accordingly, two of the ways that governments can encourage
property owners to reduce the vulnerability of their homes and
businesses is by reviewing insurance premiums and raising premiums
that are below actuarial levels and by limiting the ability of property
owners to avoid paying the cost of disaster losses themselves. We
will demonstrate a number of the ways that Congress and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency have somewhat inconsistently
attempted to encourage property owners to bear more of the risk of
damage to their own properties in Part III below.
2.

Public Encouragement through Funding of Mitigation Activities

Finally, government authorities can encourage investments in
mitigation by offering to pay for some of, much of, or even all of the
cost of mitigation. Partial funding can take the form of funding of
mitigation planning, where the government develops information
about the nature of the risk and identifies the possible projects that
could reduce the risk.7 1 The government can provide funding by
providing tax credits for (usually a portion of) the cost of mitigation
measures 72 or by allowing property owners to deduct the cost of
mitigation measures from the income used to compute income
71. Pierce County, Washington, maintains over 80 miles of river levees and
each year officials mail informational brochures to all flood plain residents. FEMA,
FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION COMMUNITY RATING

SYSTEM FACT SHEET 1 (2014), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/1395661546460-

d6859e8d080fba06b34a6fl a4d0abdba/NFIP CRS March+2014+508.pdf.
72. For pre-flood mitigation assistance there are some exemptions from
property tax increases for homeowners who choose to elevate their property. In
Dare County, North Carolina, for example, where many homes were built in the

late 1800s to early 1900s, homeowners were encouraged to elevate their homes in
response to frequent flooding. Dare County chose not to include costs to elevate
the structures into its tax assessment, despite elevation increasing the assessed
value of the home.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, LOCAL FLOOD PROOFING

PROGRAMS
41
(2005),
available
at
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/Project%/o2OPlanning/nfpc/Lo
cal%20Flood%2OProofing%20Programs%202005.pdf.
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taxes. 73 And not infrequently, particularly after disasters, federal or
state governments will make funds available to pay for approved
disaster mitigation measures.74
In sum, there are really only a few ways that governments can
encourage the mitigation of disaster risk: by providing information
about the risk, by requiring property owners, through land use
planning ordinances and building codes, to build stronger in safer
places, and by providing incentives for mitigation either by assuring
that property owners pay for the damages to their own property
caused by disasters, by assuring that insurance premiums are based
on actuarial principles, or by funding all or a portion of the cost of
mitigation planning and of mitigation projects. We have shown that
the National Flood Insurance Program includes aspects of all of these
techniques. We now examine in greater detail the efforts of Congress
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to encourage
mitigation of flood risk, and how those efforts are complicated and
frustrated when flood levels rise significantly over time.
IV. INCENTIVES FOR DISASTER MITIGATION IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE AND DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

A.

NationalFlood InsuranceProgram

Flood insurance was largely unavailable before enactment of the
National Flood Insurance Act in 1968. 75 There were a number of
reasons for the failure of the private insurance market- including
inadequate information about the risk, the very high actuarial cost of
the risk in areas where property owners were aware of flood risk, and
the refusal of property owners to pay for flood insurance if the
property had not recently experienced flooding.76 The National
73. 26 U.S.C. § 139(g) (2012). "Gross income shall not include any amount
received as a qualified disaster mitigation payment... any amount which is paid
pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act...

to or for the benefit of the owner of any property for hazard mitigation with respect
to such property. Such term shall not include any amount received for the sale or
disposition of any property." Id.
74. 44 C.F.R. § 206.226(e) (2014).
75. 44 C.F.R. § 59.2 (2014).
76. Ernest B. Abbott, Floods, Flood Insurance, Litigation, Politics - and
Catastrophe: The National FloodInsurance Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. & POL'Y J.
129, 131-32 (2008).

2014]

FLOOD INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Flood Insurance Act of 1968 recognized that "[m]any factors make it
uneconomic for private insurance industry alone to make flood
insurance available to those in need of such protection on reasonable
terms and conditions," but nonetheless concluded that:
A program of flood insurance with large-scale participation
of the Federal Government and carried out by private
insurance industry is feasible and can be initiated.77
There were three components to this "program of flood insurance"the "NFIP" created by the Act.
" Risk Identification/Assessment: Mapping of floodprone areas in communities which joined the NFIP.
Knowing the location and probable elevation of the
flood risk is critical both to determining actuarial
insurance rates and to guiding efforts to reduce
flood risk through land use and building
requirements.7 8
" Risk Mitigation: The NFIP requires participating
communities to adopt and enforce a set of
floodplain management ordinances that are
consistent with "minimum" floodplain management
requirements promulgated by FEMA. These flood
plain management ordinances were the main reason
that flood insurance could become affordable: they
were to assure that new and substantially improved
structures would be built in less flood- prone areas,
or elevated so that they would generally not suffer
damage due to flooding.
" Insurance: With flood risk information available,
and with participating communities reducing flood
risk through enforcement
of flood
plain
management regulations, the federal government
was authorized to arrange for the sale of federally

77. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2012).
78. NFIP, 42 U.S.C. § 4101.
79. Id. at § 4102; see 44 CFR Part 60, Subpart A.
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supported flood insurance in communities which
have joined the program. 80
1. "Grandfathering" and the NFIP
From the outset, the Flood Insurance Act contemplated a two-tier
classification system consisting of actuarial rates for new and
substantially improved structures, on the one hand, and subsidized
rates for structures in existence before a community joined the NFIP
and FEMA provided a Flood Insurance Rate Map on the other. 81
Thus, preexisting "grandfathered" properties had access to subsidized
rates that were lower than the actuarial risk of the property; new or
substantially improved structures had to pay actuarial rates. 82
However, because the new or substantially improved properties were
required to comply with flood plain management ordinances, the
actuarial rates for new/improved properties were substantially lower
than the subsidized rates of grandfathered properties. 83
The idea was that, over time, the subsidized properties would
slowly be eliminated through attrition, as a result of code compliance
triggered by substantial damage or substantial improvements. This
hope has not yet been realized. It appears that most damage to
property and most remodeling activities, end up costing less, or are
estimated to cost less, than the market value of the property particularly after property owners discover that a project costing
more than 50 percent of market value will trigger very expensive
requirements to elevate an entire building. 84 As of June 2012, there
80. Id. at § 4011 and 4012(c).
81. Abbott, supra note 76, at 131-33.

82. Id. at 133.
83. Owners of a grandfathered property that in fact complied with flood plain
management standards would have access to the lower actuarial rates simply by
demonstrating, on an Elevation Certificate, that it met those requirements.
84. Some property owners or builders may try to avoid triggering the 50 percent
substantial improvement rule by applying for a permit for only part of the job, then
later applying for another permit to finish the work. FEMA requires that the entire
improvement project be counted as one.
See generally FEMA, UNIT 8:
SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT AND SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE, available

at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/nfipsg unit 8.pdf In addition, depending
on the community, applications may be counted over the course of a year, over the
period of five years, ten years, or the life of the structure. CRS Coordinator's
Manual, supra note 62. When improvements and repairs total 50 percent of the
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were approximately 1,153,000 subsidized policies accounting for
roughly 20 percent of the 5.6 million policies in place.86
More significantly, there are several other categories of
"grandfathered" properties that are created by changes in flood maps
over time - and in most cases, newer maps show increased areas of
flood risk and increased elevations of expected flooding. First, any
errors in the initial flood maps tended to be biased against showing
the full flood risk. Maps that erroneously placed property into higher
risk flood zones tended to be corrected by property owners more than
maps that placed property outside of flood risk areas. 87 Second,
upstream development will generally increase flood levels and the
area subject to flooding since water moves more rapidly downstream
over roads and rooftops than in forests and grasslands. 88 Third,
levees that were initially credited as providing flood protection, were
not necessarily operated and maintained so that they could be

value of the building, a building permit should not be issued unless the entire
building is brought into NFIP compliance. 44 CFR § 60.3.
85. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 19.
86. Craig Fugate's testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy, on September 18, 2013,
indicated that approximately 20 percent of policyholders, representing 1.1 million
of the 5.6 million NFIP policies, now pay subsidized rates. Implementation of the
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: One Year After Enactment
Before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy of the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (written testimony of Craig Fugate,
Administrator, FEMA).
87. Generally, appeals of new flood map data are filed by property owners
whose property is mapped into an SFHA, or a higher flood risk area in an SFHA,
and becomes subject to new flood insurance purchase requirements, higher
insurance premiums, and new or more stringent floodplain management
requirements applicable to new or substantially improved construction. By
contrast, property owners generally do not appeal a flood map that does not place a
property in an SFHA and so imposes no increased regulatory or insurance
requirements. Appeal procedures for flood maps are specified at 42 U.S.C. § 4104
and 44 CFR Part 67; an appeal is limited to knowledge or information indicating
that the flood areas or flood elevations shown on the map are "scientifically or
technically incorrect." 42 U.S.C. § 4104(b).
88. Managing Future Development Conditions in the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/201307261602-20490-9505/nfipeval managing future development.pdf
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certified as still providing protection from the "base flood" event. 89
As a result, when new maps are created, the area protected by the
'decertified' levee is mapped as an SFHA absent enactment of a
statutory exception.
The NFIP determined early on that it should not penalize property
owners who built in full compliance with flood plain management
regulations and the flood maps in effect when the structure was
permitted. Even if new flood maps placed a structure into an SFHA,
or raised the elevation of the "base flood" (1 percent chance per year
flood), insurance premiums were to be determined with reference to
the structure's elevation and flood plain
management compliance
9
0
map.
flood
original
with reference to the
This has created a new class of "grandfathered" properties, even
though they are not eligible for the "pre-FIRM" subsidized rates and
are not categorized by FEMA as "subsidized." These properties have
a different form of subsidy: they pay the actuarial rates applicable not
to the flood risk they actually face but to the lesser risk shown on the
old, superseded maps. 91 FEMA has not tracked the number of
grandfathered properties and cannot determine their financial impact
on the program.92
But the financial impact of grandfathering is certain to grow as sea
level rises and severe weather events become more frequent as a
result of climate change. As sea level rises, coastal shores will move
inland, changing the existing SFHA. In riverine areas, increased
precipitation associated with the effects of climate change will
increase the SFHA. FEMA's Climate Report forecasts that a 6.6-foot
rise in sea level will potentially increase SFHAs by 45 percent in
riverine SFHA regions, and, assuming a fixed shoreline, 93 by 55

89. FEMA's levee certification criteria are set forth at 44 CFR § 65.10. The

criteria include both design and construction standards and requirements for
operation and maintenance plans. 44 CFR § 65.10(c) and § 65.10(d).
90. NFIP Map & Zone Grandfather Rules, available as of November 16, 2014
at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1613-204901420/grndfthr sht.pdf.
91. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 4.

92. Id.
93. See FEMA CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-2. A fixed shoreline arises
where engineering methods such as beach restoration, dredging, seawall, etc. are
used to maintain the shoreline, as opposed to allowing the shoreline to recede

naturally. Id.
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percent in coastal SFHA regions over the next 50 to 100 years.94
FEMA's climate study notes that for coastal areas, which allow the
shoreline to recede, the shore simply moves inland in proportion to
sea level rise. 95 This may not be true for coastal cities that attempt to
maintain a fixed shoreline through beach replenishment. 96 As sea
level rises, the SFHA expands, the flatter the land, and the greater the
spread of the SFHA. The SFHA engulfs nearby area and property,
formerly not within the SFHA will become part of the SFHA.97
Under current NFIP policy, these properties are eligible for their
original risk classification so long as they were built in compliance
with the NFIP at the time of construction. Illustrating the potential
magnitude of the problem, FEMA's climate report projects a worstcase scenario of "more than 50 percent, and possibly as many as 75
percent, of the policies in 2100 will be considered 'grandfathered'
with respect to their floodplain depth risk classification. '98 FEMA's
climate report predicts that the total number of NFIP policies may
increase by approximately 100 percent by the year 2100, or double
the number of policyholders it has today. 99 In the fixed shoreline
assumption, the average loss cost per policy may increase by
approximately 10 to 15 percent through the year 2020, 20 to 60
percent through the year 2080, and by approximately 90 percent by
the year 2100.100 Individual premiums per policy are expected to
increase approximately 20 to 70 percent, in today's dollars, by the
year 2100 in order to offset the projected increase in loss cost.101
Premiums would need to increase by approximately 10 to 15 percent
through the year 2020 and 10 to 50 percent through the year 2080,
given an estimated population increase in the coastal SFHA of 140
percent by the year 2 100.102
94. Id. at 6-1.
95. Id. at 5-11.
96. Id. at 4-7.
97. Id.
98. Id. This assumes a 0 percent rebuilding assumption (that homes will not
undergo 'significant improvement' in the aftermath of disaster, and thus lose
grandfather status). Id. at 5-25. It is also based on the assumption that current
policies and procedures will not change over the course of this study. Id. at 5-26.
99. FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 39,
at 2.
100. FEMA CLIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-2.
101. Id. at 6-3.
102. Id. at 6-2, 6-3.
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As the number of policies increases in flood-hazard areas, the
NFIP will have greater financial exposure in major flooding events.
As FEMA pointed out in its report, "[t]he swing loss payments made
from year to year may be larger than the NFIP's current funding and
borrowing structure accommodates."1' 0 3
2. Financial Performance of the NFIP
For over 35 years the NFIP and its National Insurance Fund
managed to limp along as it provided subsidized flood insurance
rates, grandfathered rating and coverage to repetitive loss
properties. 10 4 In the first decades, Congress was required to prop up
the Flood Insurance Fund with appropriations, but efforts to increase
premiums and reduce coverage during the Reagan administration put
the program on what appeared to be stable footing. For the 15 years
from 1990 until Hurricane Katrina, the program ran without any
additional appropriated dollars beyond those collected in insurance
premiums. 10 5 Occasional deficit years required borrowing from the
Federal Treasury, 10 6 but these loans were all repaid in full with
107
interest.
However, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demolished the appearance
of financial sustainability that the NFIP had achieved. Total flood
claims paid for losses incurred in 2005 exceeded the total losses
incurred in all 37 previous years of the program's existence.
103. Id. at 5-27 to -28.
104. See generally id. at Chapter 5.

105. See
FLOOD
STATUS,

RAWLE
INSURANCE

0.

KING, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NATIONAL
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, CHALLENGES, AND FINANCIAL

17 (June 12, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/business/documents/health-science-NFIP-123110.pdf Prior to Katrina, when
FEMA borrowed from the Treasury, Congress either retired the debt or FEMA
repaid the loans, generally within two years. FEMA's borrowing authority was less
than $2 billion. Borrowings through 1985 were repaid from congressional
appropriations. NFIP did not borrow from 1986 through 1993. Since 1994, FEMA
has repaid loans from premium and other income. Id.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 4017 (2012).
107. See A Chronology of Major Events Affecting the National Flood Insurance
Program, FEMA, December 2005, available at http://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/20130726-1602-20490-7283/nfipeval_chronology.pdf
(last visited

November 16, 2014). The chronology documents key events in the program
history, including Congressional appropriations and major deficit milestones. See,
e.g., entries 10.1987, 12/1993, 9/1995, 9/1996.
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Table 3: Difference Between Total Premiums Written and Total
Payments Made to Policyholders Under the National Flood Insurance
Program 1978-2013108

Difference Between Total Premiums Written and Total
Payments Made to Policyholders Under the NFIP 1978-2013
$5,000,000,000

$0
-$5,000,000,00q

0

-

o

Congress was forced to increase the maximum amount that the
NFIP was allowed to borrow from the Treasury to a total of $20.775
billion. 1°9
3. Potential Ways to Increase Financial Viability of NFIP
The sheer size of the NFIP's debt, in the context of major battles in
Congress over the federal deficit and federal debt, provoked
congressional review on how it might reform the program so that
flood insurance could in fact achieve the financial sustainability that
had been promised when the National Flood Insurance Act was
adopted in 1968. The challenge faced by flood insurance reformers
was that there really were, and are, only a few ways to improve the
financial sustainability of the flood insurance program. As a matter
of logic, reforms must either:
1. Raise more revenue:
a. Raise premiums/eliminate subsidies

108. Statistics by Calendar Year, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/statisticscalendar-year.

109. NFIP, 42 U.S.C. § 4016(a).
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b. Increase number of Policyholders/policies- and
hence increase in premium dollars collected
c. Diversify geographic risk 110
Reduce coverage provided for losses due to flood
a. Reduce coverage provided under policy
b. Raise deductibles
c. Increase private sector participation through
reinsurance111
Reduce the frequency of losses due to flood
a. Strengthen Flood Plain Management Regulations
i. Provide for climate change considerations in
flood plain mapping
b. Increase incentives to reduce flood risk
i. Provide for climate change considerations
for insurance rating purposes
ii. Increase funding
available for pre-disaster
112
mitigation
Reduce administrative and other costs
a. Reduce litigation expenses by strengthening
13
immunities/preemption'
Establish a reserve fund:
a. Annual target equal to 1 percent of the total
potential loss exposure114

110. As of September 2013, 61 percent of NFIP policies were in SFHAs, while
the percentage of single-family homes in non-SFHAs consisted of about 1 percent.
Id. at 22.
111. Id. at 15.
112. In 2013, FEMA received applications for $304 million in Flood Mitigation
Assistance, more than twice the appropriations received for the program that year.
Id. at 39. Subsequently, FEMA requested $400 million in Pre-Disaster Mitigation,
combined with $150 million in base funding for National Flood Insurance Program
mitigation grants, representing an increase of $450 million over the 2014 spending
level. FEMA's Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (prepared

statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator, and FEMA).
113. See Standard Flood Insurance Policy, 44 C.F.R. § 61 App. A(1) at Part VII.
General Conditions, R. ("Suit Against Us") and Part IX What Law Governs.
114. At the end of FY 2013, FEMA's potential loss exposure was $1.29 trillion;
as a result FEMA's annual target reserve would be $12.9 billion. U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 23, at 10.

2014]

FLOOD INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE

b. Annual surcharge for residential and commercial
policies
Congress and FEMA had already pursued each of these strategies
over the past 40 years to improve the financial results of the NFIP.11 56
But the $18 billion deficit caused by Hurricane Katrina'
demonstrated that these efforts did not go far enough. Spurred by the
staunch opposition of key legislators to any reauthorization of the
National Flood Insurance Program that did not address its financial
shortcomings,' 7 years of efforts to reform the NFIP culminated in
major legislation that became law on July 6, 2012: the BiggertWaters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.1 18 Before we review
the controversy around this legislation, we must summarize the ways
in which Congress has addressed the mitigation of flood risk in
disaster legislation.
B.

DisasterMitigation under the Stafford Act

Since enactment of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Congress has
provided funding for emergency response and disaster recovery
activities upon declaration of a "major disaster" or "emergency" by
the President of the United States.' 9 The assistance is now provided
primarily under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act ("Stafford Act") as amended.12 Stafford
Act assistance can take the form of direct federal assistance or federal
disaster assistance grants to reimburse the costs incurred by state or
115. For a brief history of these efforts, see Ernest B. Abbott, Floods, Flood
Insurance, Litigation, Politics - and Catastrophe: The National Flood Insurance
Program, 1 SEA GRANT L. & POL'Y J 129, 129-142 (2008).
116. ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INSURANCE INFORMATION

INSTITUTE, HURRICANE KATRINA: THE FIVE YEAR ANNIVERSARY, 6 (JULY 2010),
available at http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/1007Katrina5Anniversary.pdf.
117. From September 2008 to September 2011, the NFIP has been extended 11
times. KING, supra note 105. Dispute over the need to address the cost to
taxpayers of the NFIP and its debt led the program to lapse, due to expiration of its
authorizing legislation, three times, during this same period. H.R. REP. No. 112102, at 19 (2011). In May 2012, the price exacted for a two-month extension of the
authorization of the NFIP was elimination of subsidized insurance premiums for
second homes. H.R. 5740, as passed by the Senate on May 24, 2012. The House
agreed to the Senate amendment on May 30, 2012. KING, supra note 105, at 4.
118. BW- 12, supra note 16.
119. See Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5192 (2012).
120. Stafford Act, supra note 24.
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local governments, Indian tribes, and by certain "governmental type"
nonprofit entities 12 1 in performing emergency work, or in repairing,
restoring, reconstructing, or replacing facilities damaged by event
declared as a major disaster. 122
Assistance to "Individuals and
families" is also available for temporary housing and to address
various medical, dental, childcare, funeral expenses, and "other
needs" created by the disaster, 123 although assistance is capped at
approximately $30,000.124
In general, Stafford Act authority to
assist state and local governments in protecting lives and property
from an "immediate threat" to life, property, and public health and
safety is written very broadly, 125 while the authorities to pay for the
damages and losses caused by the disaster are far more narrowly
written.
The purpose of the Stafford Act is not just to spur preparedness
and provide assistance from disasters. The Stafford Act is also
intended to encourage:
[I]ndividuals, States, and local governments to protect
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement
or replace governmental assistance; [and]
[E]ncourage hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses
from disasters, including development of land use and
127
construction regulations.
Over the years, Congress has included a large number of
requirements and incentives intended to spur disaster mitigation
efforts by individuals, states, and local governments.
Some
requirements are multi-hazard in nature; others are directed

121. 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (2014).
122. Stafford Act, §§ 402, 403, 406, 407 and 502; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170a, 5170b,
5172, 5173, and 5192.
123. Id. at § 408(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 5174.
124. The Individual and Housing program provides cash grants up to a limit,
which is adjusted annually for inflation. 42 USC § 5174(h).
125. Id. at § 402-03. 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)-(b).
126. Compare 42 USC § 5170b(a)(provide assistance essential to meeting
immediate threats, including broad categories of work and services to save lives
and protect property), with 42 USC § 5172 and 44 CFR § 206.226 and § 206.228
(specifying specific eligible work and costs).
127. Id. at § 101; 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4)-(5).
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specifically to mitigation of flood risk. Mitigation and mitigation
planning requirements were dramatically expanded in the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000.128 Indeed, the Stafford Act includes so many
requirements and incentives that significant bureaucracy and red tape
is required to administer them.
1. Requirements / Incentives to Plan for Mitigation
First, as a condition to the availability within a state of any
recovery assistance under the Stafford Act, the state must have a
FEMA-approved "standard" hazard mitigation plan assessing the
risks of hazards within the state, analyzing the state's vulnerabilities
to those risks and the potential
losses therefrom, and describing the
129
strategy.
state's mitigation
Second, local governments and Indian tribes must have in place a
local or tribal mitigation plan, respectively, in order to be eligible to
receive funding for mitigation projects.130
Third, the funding available from the Disaster Relief Fund for
mitigation projects is considerably enhanced- to 20 percent of the
cost of non-mitigation expenditures in response to a major disaster- if
the state has applied for and received FEMA approval of an
"Enhanced Mitigation Plan" demonstrating that it has developed a
comprehensive mitigation program, effectively uses available
mitigation 1 funding, and is capable of managing the increased
13
funding.
2.

Requirements for/Funding of Stronger Construction Practices

FEMA also has powerful discretionary authority when
administering its disaster relief grant and loan programs to assure that
construction undertaken with disaster assistance grants and loans are
in accordance with modem construction standards. Stafford Act
Section 323, titled "Minimum Standards for Public and Private
Structures," provides that, "as a condition of receipt of a disaster loan
or grant under this Act, the recipient shall carry out any repair or
128. Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552-59

(2000).
129. 44 C.F.R. § 206.226(b) (2014), referencing Standard State Mitigation Plans
described in 44 C.F.R. § 201.4 (2014).
130. 44 C.F.R. § 201.6(a)(1); § 201.7(a)(1).
131. Id. at § 201.5(a).
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construction to be financed with the loan or grant in accordance with
applicable standards of safety, decency, and sanitation and 132
in
conformity with applicable codes, specifications, and standards."
The same section also gives FEMA authority to "require safe land
use and construction practices,
after consultation with State and local
133
officials.,
government
Not only can FEMA require compliance with applicable
construction and land use standards as a condition of its funding of an
otherwise eligible construction project, but FEMA includes the cost
of such compliance as part of the disaster assistance. 134 The very
definition of what costs are eligible for federal reimbursement
includes the cost of compliance with "applicable codes,
specifications and standards., 135 In addition, the definition includes,
as part of the "net eligible cost" of a repair or reconstruction project,
the cost of "floodplain management and hazard mitigation criteria
136
required by the President."
3.

Further Statutory Incentives to Encourage Mitigation/Penalties
for Failure to Mitigate

There are a number of additional restrictions on availability of
disaster assistance for structures that are damaged by flooding or
damaged on multiple occasions. Specifically:
" Virtually no disaster assistance can be provided under the
Stafford Act to construct structures in areas mapped as a
floodway or in a coastal high hazard area.137
"

No
disaster
assistance
can
be
provided
for
construction/repair of substantial damage to structures in

132. Stafford Act, § 323(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 5165(a)(a)(1).
133. Id. at § 323(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 5165a(a)(2).

134. Id. at § 406(e); 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e)(1)(A)(ii).
135. Id. For FEMA's regulations defining what codes, specifications, and
standards are "applicable," see 44 C.F.R. § 206.226(d) (2014). Significantly, these
codes must be in writing and in effect prior to the disaster.
136. Id.
137. 44 C.F.R. § 9.11(d)(1) (2014). FEMA's regulations at 44 C.F.R. Part 9
were adopted in response to President Carter's issuance of Executive Order 11988
in 1977. See Elliot Mittler et al., AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, STATE
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

(Oct. 2006).
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"

"

"

Special Flood Hazard Area unless elevated/protected as
required by the National Flood Insurance Program. 138
No disaster assistance can be provided for repair of
previously uninsured structures unless the applicant first
agrees to obtain and maintain such insurance as may be
reasonably available, adequate and
necessary to protect
13 9
against future loss of the structure.
No flood disaster assistance can be provided to structures
that received flood disaster assistance in a prior disaster
unless all 140previously required insurance has been
maintained.
For any structure located in a Special Flood Hazard Area,
and designated as such for one year or more, but not
covered by an active NFIP policy on the date of the
disaster, the amount of the otherwise eligible funding will
be reduced by the lesser of the value of the facility or the
amount of proceeds which
would have been received if
141
covered by such a policy.
4.

FEMA Mitigation Grant Programs

Finally, the Stafford Act includes several programs under which
FEMA will fund the lion's share of the cost of disaster mitigation
projects. First, FEMA can fund mitigation as part of the repair of
disaster damaged facilities.142 Under this authority, a damaged
structure must be repaired with stronger walls, sturdier components,
and the like, to reduce the likelihood of similar damage in the
future. 143 The applicant must show that the mitigation measures are
cost effective, and the cost of these mitigation measures generally is
not more than the cost of simple repair/replacement without
138. Id. at § 9.11(d)(2)-(3) (2013).
139. Stafford Act, § 311(a); 42 U.S.C. § 5154(a)(1).
140. Id. at § 311(b); 42 U.S.C. § 5154(b). For good measure, Congress adds a

special provision prohibiting waiver of requirement for purchase of flood insurance
as a condition of the receipt of federal disaster assistance. Id. at § 408(c)(3)(B); 42
U.S.C. § 5174(c)(3)(B).
141. Id. at § 406(d); 42 U.S.C. § 5172(d).
142. FEMA, POLICY 9526.1, HAZARD MITIGATION FUNDING UNDER SECTION
406
7.1 (2010), available at http://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-statetribal-and-non-profit/hazard-mitigation-funding-under-section-406-0.
143. Stafford Act, § 406(e); 42 U.S.C. § 5172(e).
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mitigation. 144 Statutory authority for this mitigation arises from
Section 406 of the Stafford Act and its definition of the "net eligible
cost" of repairing or replacing damaged facilities: "net eligible cost"
includes the cost of "flood plain management and hazard mitigation

criteria required by the President.,

145

In practice, mitigation

measures are rarely "required" unless the applicant proposes to
include mitigation measures in its reconstruction project. There is no
separate source of funding for this work; the cost of mitigation is
funded from the same Disaster Relief Fund appropriation provided
for Stafford Act disaster assistance expenditures, and the cost of
Section 406 mitigation is not separately listed in management reports.
As a result, it is not easy to determine how much the federal
government pays for this type of mitigation.
Second, Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes significant

funding of post-disaster mitigation through a separate "Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program," or HMGP. 146 State, local governments,
and certain non-profit organizations can be eligible for grants of "not
more than" 75 percent of the cost of mitigation projects. 147 These
projects must also be shown to be cost effective, but need not be part
of the repair of restoration of a damaged portion of a facility. 148

144. There are no program-wide limits on funds, but each project must be costeffective and approved by FEMA. Mitigation measures may amount up to 15
percent of the total eligible cost of the eligible repair work on a particular project.
Id. at 406
7.2.. Under Section 404 of the Stafford Act, Hazard Mitigation, the
President may contribute up to 75 percent of the cost of hazard mitigation measures
which reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area
affected by a major disaster. Stafford Act, § 404(a); 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
145. Stafford Act, § 406(e), as in currently in effect. (Section 205(d)(1) of the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, P.L. No. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552-59, amended
Section 406(e), but the change will become effect only if FEMA adopts
implementing regulations, which has not yet occurred even 14 years later).
146. Id. at § 404; 42 U.S.C. § 5170c.
147. Id.

148. For example, an undersized culvert may cause flood damage to nearby
homes and infrastructure when water backs up behind it - but the culvert itself is
not damaged by the flood. The installation of a larger culvert would not qualify for
Section 406 mitigation funding - but could be eligible for funding under Section
404. See, e.g., Id. at § 404; 42 U.S.C. § 5170c; 44 C.F.R § 206.434 (2013). See
also FEMA 322, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GUIDE 124-125 (June 2007); FEMA 345,
HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM DESK REFERENCE (Oct. 1999); FEMA 321,
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE POLICY DIGEST 65 (Jan. 2008).
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Funding for mitigation under Section 404 is appropriated by
Congress virtually automatically based on a percentage of the cost of
the "estimated aggregate amount of grants to be made (less any
associated administrative costs)" with respect to a disaster 149 The
percentage amounts available in states with an approved enhanced
mitigation plan is 20 percent; 15 in other states the percentage varies:
15 percent (for amounts under $2 billion), 10 percent (for amounts
between $2 and $10 billion), 7.5 percent (for amounts between $10
and $35.333 billion). 151 Because the amount of funding available is
capped, the amount is computed by applying the appropriate
percentages to the "estimated aggregate amount of grants" made
available with respect to a disaster, Section 404 grants are generally
administered by state grantees as a competitive grant program.152
Section 203 of the Stafford Act also authorizes funding of "Predisaster mitigation." 153 Its objectives are similar to the objectives of
the HMGP, but funding of this program has been quite limited since
its inception. The Obama administration has proposed eliminating
funding of this program in its budget for several years, 154 although
Congress15 5 has so far appropriated some modest funding of $25
million.
A challenge in administering all of the Stafford Act's mitigation
programs has been identification of the funds that can supply the
"non-federal share" required in a program that can fund "up to" (and
149. Stafford Act, § 404; 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
150. FEMA,

HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE UNIFIED GUIDANCE: HAZARD
MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM, PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION PROGRAM, AND FLOOD
MITIGATION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
3 (July 12, 2013), available at

http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/15463cb34a2267a900bde4774c3f42e4/F1NAL Guidance_081213_508.pdf.
151. Stafford Act, § 404a; 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
152. FEMA, HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE UNIFIED GUIDANCE, supra note
150, at 59.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 5133 (2012).

154.

OFFICE OF MGMT.

& BUDGET,

BUDGET OF THE

U.S. GOVERNMENT,

FISCAL

YEAR 2013: CUTS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND SAVINGS 74 (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/ccs.pdf.
155. CONSOLIDATED AND FURTHER CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS
ACT, 2013, P.L. 113-46
(2013). Division D, heading National Predisaster
Mitigation Fund: "For the predisaster mitigation grant program under section 203
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 5133), $25,000,000, to remain available until expended.
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so not more than) 75 percent of the cost of any project. 156 A very
common source of funds for the "non-federal share" needed for
mitigation projects is provided from Community Development Block
Grants, ("CDBG") from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. 157 The popularity of CDBG funding is largely due to a
quirk in the structure of the CDBG program. Virtually all other
sources of federal funds retain their "federal" character when
awarded, and so cannot satisfy a requirement that 25 percent of an
HMGP project comes from a "non-federal" source. However, CDBG
grants lose their "federal" character when awarded, and so applicants
receiving CDBG funds can use those funds to fulfill non-federal cost
share requirements.158 It is the flexibility in utilization of this
program that has made appropriations to CDBG such a critical part of
federal disaster assistance and mitigation grant projects.
All of these requirements, incentives, and restrictions that sought to
encourage mitigation planning and mitigation of properties from risk
have been in effect for a number of years. FEMA's procedures for
implementing some of these restrictions may not be foolproof. But in
any event, as noted at the outset of this article, the number of disaster
declarations and the dollar value lost in disasters has been rising
dramatically. These efforts have not been enough.
V.

FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM LEGISLATION: Two STEPS FORWARD,
ONE STEP BACK

A.

Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012

The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 became
law when House and Senate managers attached a compromise
version of House and Senate flood insurance reform legislation to a
highway transportation authorization bill that had major legislative
support, the "Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act," or
156. 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(a).
157. One example showing the interaction between CDBG grants and disaster
assistance programs is found in the Second Allocation, Waivers, and Alternative
Requirements for Grantees Receiving Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) Disaster Recovery Funds in Response to Disasters Occurring in 2013, 79
Fed. Reg. 31964 (June 3, 2014).
158. CDBG is a federal grant, that when used for its intended purposes, and
provided that it is authorized to do so, may be used as a source of local match. The
total funds must not exceed the total eligible project costs. See id.
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'
"MAP-21. 159
Subtitle II of MAP 21 was the Biggert-Waters Act,
and its 53 pages covered the full range of issues that had proven
controversial in the multi-year reauthorization process. The Act
sought to create a factual and analytical basis for future reforms by
requiring FEMA to study or make recommendations on how to
address:
" Repayment of outstanding debt of the NFIP [By requiring
FEMA to transmit a plan to Congress].160
" The availability and affordability of insurance for natural
16 1
catastrophe perils generally.
"
Mapping of future conditions of higher flood risk due to
upstream development and sea level rise [by creating a task
force to provide recommendations] .162
" Mapping of residual risk behind certified levees
[Report]. 163

• Expansion of coverage for business interruption and living
expenses. [Study]. 164
• Mapping and flood insurance credit for communities whose
levees cannot be certified as providing adequate protection
- but are working on fixing them

165

-

and a "task force" to

study how structures should be accredited. 166
• Creation of a scientific advisory panel to review disputes
over mapping issues, local data in flood maps. 167 Require a

159. See BW-12, supra note 16.
160. Id. at § 100213.
161. Id. at § 100247.
162. Id. at § 100215(d). NFIP's Community Rating System already credits
communities which take into account future conditions in their flood plain
management regulations' implementing provisions: such as providing information
about areas predicted to be susceptible to future flooding due to climate change or
sea level rise, basing the community's regulatory map on future-conditions
hydrology, using regulatory flood elevations in the V and Coastal A Zones that
reflect future conditions including sea level rise, and informing prospective buyers
of the potential for future flooding. CRS Coordinators Manual, supra note 62, at
450-14.
163. BW-12, § 100231(e).
164. Id. at § 100233.
165. Id. at § 100230.
166. Id. at § 100226.
167. Id. at § 100218.
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study of how interagency
coordination of flood mapping
16 8
improved.
can be
"
Expense reimbursements paid to insurance companies for
selling and adjusting flood insurance policies [Study]. 169
"
Participation in and affordability of flood insurance [Study
and Report] 170
However, what turned out to be the most significant, or at least
controversial, changes enacted by BW-12 were a few short sections
at the beginning of the bill. These sections were apparently added at
the last minute of the legislative process to obtain the votes of
lawmakers concerned that the systemic subsidies in the NFIP created
a financial burden on taxpayers.
These sections aggressively
ratcheted up premiums for many classifications of flood insurance
policies at rates of increase that Congress had previously staunchly
prohibited.
First, the Biggert-Waters Act accepted the argument that while it
may be appropriate to gradually remove subsidies on premiums for
the current owners of property, there was no need to transfer these
subsidies along to future purchasers of the property. The rationale
for immediately removing subsidies for new owners was that new
owners would have information about the flood risk of the property
and what the premiums for insurance of that risk could be, and could
decide whether to purchase the property based on the cost of flood
risk. Section 100205(a)(1)(B) added a new subsection of the NFIA
titled "No Extension of Subsidy to New Policies or Lapsed Policies,"
and provided that:
The Administrator shall not provide flood insurance to
prospective insureds at rates less than [actuarial rates] ... for
(1) any property not insured by the flood insurance
program as of [July 6, 2012];
(2) any property purchased after [July 6, 2012];
(3) any policy under the flood insurance program that
has lapsed in coverage, as a result of a deliberate
choice of the holder of such policy; or
168. Id. at § 100221.
169. Id. at § 100224.
170. Id. at § 100236.
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(4) any prospective insured who refuses to accept any
offer for mitigation assistance by the Administrator
(including an offer to relocate), including an offer of
mitigation assistance [under the Stafford Act
mitigation programs described earlier in this article] or
in connection with (i) a repetitive loss property, 171 or
(ii) a severe repetitive loss property.172
Under this section, the transition from subsidized to actuarial rates
would take effect immediately upon sale of the property. It meant
that, for high-risk properties, the seller of property may have paid a
flood insurance premium of $700 or $800 per year - and, at closing,
the buyer would discover that flood insurance premiums had
increased to $7,000 or $10,000 or even more per year. Coupled with
a federal law requiring mortgage lenders to assure that borrowers
obtain and maintain flood insurance, and to purchase flood insurance
for borrowers if the borrowers do not do so, this meant that many
borrowers discovered that they could not afford to purchase the
property at closing. The true impact of this section became known
when FEMA published its Flood Insurance Manual, with revised
premium tables and instructions to insurance companies selling the
Standard Flood Insurance Policy, on October 1, 2012.173
Second, Congress specified that flood insurance subsidies would
be more gradually eliminated for a relatively long list of categories of
properties.
Thus, Section 100205(a)(1)(A) amended the Flood
Insurance Act so that premiums were to rise by 25 percent per year
for the following group of properties:
* Any residential property that is not a primary residence.
* Any severe repetitive loss property (even without an offer
of mitigation funding).
* Any property with cumulatively more flood losses than the
value of the property.
* Any business property.
171. A "Repetitive Loss Structure" is defined in the Standard Flood Insurance
Policy, 44 C.F.R. § 61 App. A(1) at III(D)(3)(a) (2014).

172. BW-12, § 100205(a)(1)(B). Definition of "Severe Repetitive Loss Property"
was the same as preexisting definition at 42 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(b) (2006) (repealed
2012).
173. FEMA, NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL (October 2012), available at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/28812?id-6393.
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Any property which has incurred substantial damage of 50
percent or more.
" Any property with an improvement greater than 30 percent
of the value of the property.174
"

By contrast, under the NFIP prior to BW-12, FEMA was permitted
to, but was not required to, increase premiums for any subsidized
properties, but was prohibited from increasing premiums on any class
of properties by more than 10 percent per year.175
Finally, a very controversial provision in the Biggert-Waters Act
was intended to eliminate the grandfathered rating of structures
which had complied with flood plain management regulations at the
time of construction, but which were no longer compliant due to map
changes/updated flood risk information. 176
Section 100207,
innocuously titled "Premium Adjustment," provided that:
[A]ny property located in an area that is participating in the
national flood insurance program shall have the risk
premium rate charged for flood insurance on such property
adjusted to accurately reflect the current risk of flood177to
such property, subject to any other provision of this Act.
This provision included a transition provision.
Rather than
immediately increasing premiums to the actuarial level appropriate
given the building's elevation and physical characteristics, the
increase to reflect the higher flood risk was to be phased in:
Any increase in the risk premium rate charged for flood
insurance on any property that is covered by a flood
insurance policy on the effective date of such an update
that is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5year period, at the rate of17820 percent for each year
following such effective date.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

BW-12 § 100204(a)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 4015(e) (2012).
BW-12, § 100207.
Id.
Id.
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Nonetheless, the annual increase in premiums could be very
substantial. If a home was not mapped in a flood zone, its premiums
could be quite low. Once mapped in a flood zone, the actuarial
premium for the property, which would not likely be elevated or
include the flood vents that reduce flood risk, could increase by an
order of magnitude (e.g., from $700 to $7,000). To reach a $7,000
annual premium in five years, the annual percentage premium
increase would be almost 60% per year.179 Increases of similar scale
were possible if the flood zone was revised from an "A" zone, which
assumes no significant risk of wave action, to a coastal "V" zone
based on new risk of flooding, or if the base flood elevation shown
for a zone increased by 5 or more feet. 18° The elimination of
grandfathering generated a storm of protest even before FEMA took
any steps to implement it.
In addition to the gradual elimination of subsidies and grandfather
rating, BW-12 enacted a number of other provisions designed to
increase revenues. It revised the way that FEMA computes actuarial
rates. FEMA's actuaries previously advised that it had computed
actuarial rates based on "average historical loss year," not including
catastrophic loss years such as occurred in 2005.18 Section 100211,
"Considerations in Determining Chargeable Premium Rates," added
a new "Rule of Construction" in calculating the "average historical
loss year" requiring FEMA to use generally accepted actuarial
principles when deriving actuarial premium rates and to include
catastrophic loss years in its computations.1 82 Another BW-12
provision increases deductibles for flood insurance properties from
179. Computation: $70*(1+x) 5 - $7,000, where x is the annual percentage
increase in premium divided by 100..
180. For example, in a VE zone, the flood insurance premium rate on a structure
1 foot above BFE is $.90/$100. If base flood elevation increases by 5 feet - as
occurred prior to Hurricane Sandy in some parts of Long Island - the flood
insurance premium rate would rise to $3.58/$100. FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL Rate - Table 9 (June 2014),
available
at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 139810712626026c03dc2b6f29b6c079dea2987f89c89/05 rating_508june2014 b.pdf.
181. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
LEVEES AND THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM IMPROVING POLICIES

AND
PRACTICES
72
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record id- 18309&page-72.
182. BW-12, § 100211 (adding a new subparagraph (i) to 42 U.S.C. § 4015
(2012)).
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$1,000184 to $2,000 for 'pre-FIRM' structures that are
eligible for subsidies. 185 BW-12 also placed increased penalties on
$500183 to

mortgage lenders who failed to require borrowers to purchase
flood
186
violation.
per
$2,000
to
violation
per
$350
insurance, from
In sum, the Biggert-Waters Act went almost 'all in' in its effort to
assure that property owners had the proper financial incentives to
mitigate the risk of flooding. When property owners pay for flood
insurance at actuarial rates, then the value of property in high-risk
areas will decline. Homebuyers will choose to purchase homes in
less risky areas, such as coastal zones. Developers will choose to
avoid flood-prone areas because the prices for sale of new homes,
burdened by high flood insurance rates, make it extremely difficult to
make a profit. Property and business owners in high-risk areas would
have an exceptionally strong incentive to invest in elevation or other
mitigation measures that will reduce vulnerability to flood damage
and hence reduce flood insurance premiums.
However, news of BW-12's impact on individual homeowners and
the real estate industry began to spread in the months following
enactment of BW-12. Flood insurance premiums did not rise
immediately upon enactment. FEMA makes changes to premiums
semi-annually through publication of its Flood Insurance Manual on
May 1 and October 1 of each year, so the significance of BW-12's
premium increases did not begin to hit home until October 1, 2012.
Superstorm Sandy struck the Northeast at the end of October 2012 triggering the gradual elimination of subsidies for hundreds of
thousands of 'substantially damaged' properties, and demonstrating
that many existing flood maps in the region significantly understated
flood risk. The realization that grandfather status would not continue
183. $500 for Pre-Firm properties located in flood zone B, C, X, A99, D in 2005.
FEMA, NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL Rate 12 (May 2005), available at
http://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance-manual/flood-insurance-manual-effective-

may-1-2005.
184. $1,000 for Pre-Firm located in properties located in flood zone B, C, X,
A99, D in 2012. FEMA, NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL Rate 12 (October
2012),

available at

http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1851-

25045-8388/ 05 ratingoct2Ol2.pdf.
185. $2,000 FEMA, NFIP FLOOD

INSURANCE MANUAL

Rate 14 (June 2014),

available
at
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 139810712626026c03dc2b6f29b6c079dea2987f89c89/05 rating_508june2014 b.pdf. BW-12, §
100210, amending 42 U.S.C. § 4019 (2012).

186. BW-12, § 100208.
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for structures built in compliance with the old flood maps caused a
stir even though FEMA had never gotten around to implementing this
provision. 187 It became apparent that a flood insurance program,
intended to protect homeowners from losing their homes in the event
of future flood damage, would cause the virtually immediate loss of
homes due to foreclosure. Congresswoman Maxine Waters began a
quick retreat from her previous association with the Biggert-Waters
flood insurance reforms and announced that the Act had never been
intended to cause such substantial increases in premiums. 188 Most
other members of Congress joined in the scramble to back away from
BW-12. The rollback of BW-12 was signed into law on March 21,
2014. 189
B.

The Homeowner FloodInsuranceAffordability Act of 2014

The new "Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014"
("HFIAA-2014") 190 was about a third the length of the BiggertWaters Act, and its primary focus was to roll back many, but not all,
of the flood insurance premium increases mandated by BiggertWaters. Indeed, given the full-fledged Congressional retreat from
Biggert-Waters, it is perhaps surprising how many of BW-12's
premium increases survived.

187. FEMA issued a memorandum on August 2, 2013 to clarify the
implementation timeline of provisions of BW-12 and stated that FEMA would not
implement the grandfather provisions "until at least late 2014." Jhun de la Cruz,
FEMA, W-13043, OCTOBER 1, 2013 PROGRAM CHANGES IMPACT ON NFIP
GRANDFATHER
PROCEDURES
(AUG.
2,
2013)
(mem.), available at
http://nfipiservice.com/Stakeholder/pdf/bulletin/w- 13043 .pdf.
188. Rep. Waters, Author of Flood Reform Act, Calls for Delay in
Implementation,
INS.
J.
(Sept.
30,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/20l3/09/30/306602.htm.
189. The vote for passage was bipartisan. The Senate voted 72-22 for passage;
the "yea" voters included Senator Cruz of Texas, who had been one of the most
strident Senators seeking to pressure fiscal reforms by opposing funding of the
federal government in the fall of 2012. U.S. Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes
Congress2
Session,
senate.gov
(Mar.
13,
2014),
1 13 '
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote-cfm.cfm?&con
gress=113&session=2&vote=00078. The vote for passage in the House was 30691, with Republicans voting 126-86 and Democrats voting 180-5. Final Vote
Results
for
Roll
Call
91,
Clerk.house.gov
(Mar.
4,
2014),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/rolIO91.xml.
190. HFIAA, supra note 17.
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The first substantive provision of HFIA-2014 was for "Repeal of
Certain Rate Increases." 191 This section amended the new Section
1307(g) of the National Flood Insurance Act- added by BW-12- "by
striking paragraphs (1) and (2)," effective as of July 6, 2012.192 By
doing so, the immediate increase to actuarial rates for these
properties was repealed. FEMA was also directed to arrange for the
refund of the increased premium dollars that had been paid as a result
of BW-12's rate increase. 193 The increase to actuarial rates for
properties where insurance lapsed "as a result of the deliberate
choice" of the policyholder was retained, but Congress carved out an
exception for policyholders who allowed their policy to lapse "as a
result of the property covered by the policy no longer being required
' 194
to retain such coverage."
The second substantive provision of HFIAA-2014, "Restoration of
Grandfathered Rates," simply repealed BW-12's removal (over a
five-year period) of grandfathering of properties as a result of
changes in flood insurance maps. 195 The restoration was effective as
of July 6, 2014, and no refund provisions were provided since the
provision had never been implemented.
None of the other rate increases adopted by BW-12 were repealed.
Instead, HFIAA-2014 slowed down their implementation. Thus, for
the categories of properties that were singled out for 25 percent
premium increases until actuarial rates were achieved, 196 HFIAA191. Id. at § 3(a)(1)(A).
192. Id.
193. Id. at § 3(a)(3)-(4).
194. Id. at § 3(a)(1)(B). For example, a property may have been located in a
flood zone, and its owner have acquired flood insurance in compliance with the
mandatory flood insurance purchase requirement. If a new floor map places a
property outside of the flood zone flood insurance is no longer required and the
owner may have cancelled coverage. In this situation, cancellation does not trigger

loss of subsidized rates.
195. Id. at § 4.
196. Any residential property that is not a primary residence; any severe
repetitive loss property (even without an offer of mitigation funding); any property
with cumulatively more flood losses than the value of the property; any business
property; any property which has incurred substantial damage of 50 percent or
more. BW-12, supra note 16, at § 100204(a)(1)(A). HFIAA-2104 did eliminate
BW-12's reduction in the size of an improvement that would trigger actuarial rates;
the triggering percentage was restored to 50 percent of the market value of the
property. HFIAA, § 15 (a section intriguingly titled "Home Improvement
Fairness").
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2014 retained the 25 percent per year increases. 197 Second homes,
business properties, and repetitive loss properties can expect 25
percent premium increases for some time. The rate of allowable
premium increases for other properties, which was 20 percent per
year under BW- 12, was reduced to 18 percent. 19'
The premium revenue lost by the repeal of 'certain rate increases'
and of 'grandfathered rates' was to be somewhat offset by enacting a
surcharge on all flood insurance policies of either $25 or, if the
property is a business property or a residence that is not a primary
residence, $250.199
HFIAA-2014 also enacted a number of additional provisions in an
effort to balance the premium protection being provided to property
owners in subsidized areas against the objective of achieving
financial sustainability and providing incentives to property owners
to mitigate risk.
FEMA was required to offer optional high-deductible policies for
homeowners.200 FEMA was required to allow homeowners to pay
201
insurance premiums monthly rather than annually.
Flood
insurance would not be required on detached structures, such as
garages, that may be part of a property but detached from the primary
residential structure. 202 FEMA was required to incorporate some
flood mitigation investments in homes- perhaps including3 floodproofing- in its determination of flood insurance premiums.20
VI. LIVING WITH HIGHER RATES

The roller coaster ride of flood insurance reform over the last two
years has taught several lessons.
First, the true actuarial rates of properties that are not elevated
above base flood elevation and that do not have proper flood vents
and breakaway walls in lower enclosures can be very high. For many
Americans, purchase of a home is the biggest investment of their
lives, and the monthly mortgage payment (with taxes and insurance)
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at § 5; See also BW-12, at §100205 (c)(3).
HFIAA, § 5.
Id. at § 8.
Id. at § 12.
Id. at § 11.
Id. at § 13.
Id. at § 14, § 26.
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is at the upper end of what they can afford. BW-12 demonstrated the
consequences of an immediate jump to actuarial rates. Adding
$1,000 per month ($12,000 per year) to a mortgage payment would
push many existing homeowners into foreclosure and force buyers to
walk away from contracts once the flood insurance rates were
disclosed at closing. The impact of a rapid jump in insurance
premiums on property owners is even more powerful because, for
most owners of property in mapped flood zones, flood insurance is
not voluntary; virtually every such property owner with a mortgage is
required by federal law to obtain and maintain flood insurance. The
ironic result of the BW-12 increases was that a program designed to
protect homeowners from losing their homes due to the possibility of
future flooding instead threatened homeowners with the probability
of losing their homes due to foreclosure well before any floodwaters
arrived. These immediate premium increases have been repealed.
Second, most property owners in subsidized properties can expect
to see flood insurance premium increases that, over the life of their
mortgages, will rise toward actuarial levels. At the 25 percent per
year rates specified in BW-12 for business properties and second
homes and repetitive loss properties, it only takes 11 years for a
$1,000 per year premium to reach $11,000 per year.204 These
increases will have only begun to bite- getting to two or three times
the starting premium level- by the time Congress must reauthorize
the program again in 2017. 20 5 Increases for subsidized properties that
do not fall within the "25 percent per year" group will take longer to
get to the pain level. If future property buyers believe that these
increases will not be repealed, we can expect to see a significant
decrease in the market value of subsidized properties.
Third, the need to eliminate the growing and predicted
subsidization of flood insurance when flood risk increases faces
enormous challenges.
HFIAA-2014 restored grandfathering of
premium rates when flood maps change to reflect increased flood
risk. So premium rates will not 'internalize' the real cost of flooding
if the sea level rise now being predicted takes place. Property owners
will pay the actuarial rates that were in effect when a structure was
built, and will remain eligible for those rates until 'new construction'
204. Formula for computation: 1.2 5t , where t is the number of years from the
start of premium increases.
205. BW-12, § 100203. The NFIP is reauthorized until September 30, 2017.
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or 'substantial improvement' wipes the slate clean. Given the scale
of projected increases in Standard Flood Hazard Areas and sea level
rise, the NFIP will continue to have financial trouble.
Hidden among the long list of studies and reports mandated by
BW-12 and HFIAA-2014 are several that should inform the debate
over flood risk and flood insurance that must occur when the NFIP's
authorization expires in 2017. We will know more about the
affordability of flood insurance, about residual risk behind levees,
and, of particular importance to the issue of climate change, whether
FEMA can or should use revise flood maps to show the flood risk
that may be generated by "future conditions" caused by projected
upstream development and climate change. And we will know more
about how the flood insurance rate increases already underway have
impacted communities and property owners.
Americans' love of living by the water will continue to bring
people and homes and infrastructure into areas of potential flood risk.
The cost of this flood risk will become prohibitive without
continuous efforts to provide information about flood risk and how it
is changing and to provide information and incentives so that
development in flood-prone areas is reasonably safe from flooding.

